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This article looks at the issues that arise at a jurisdictional stage
when a claim in tort containing foreign elements is made in a
Singapore court. In particular, the amended Order 11 Rule 1 ( f )
RSC is examined. Because of the paucity of local authorities,
extensive references are made to relevant Commonwealth cases to
aid in the interpretation of the local provision.
I. INTRODUCTION
A tort may be described as possessing an international character if there
are foreign elements involved. For example, the parties involved may be
from different countries. Even if the parties are from the same country, the
act or damage may have been done in a different country, or in different
countries. In such cases, the plaintiff’s choice of forum for litigation is not
confined to a single jurisdiction. Apart from practical points like cost and
convenience, the choice of the forum is also affected by the consideration
that the forum will apply its own private international law to choose the
governing substantive law to determine the claim. Another important
consideration in choosing the jurisdiction in which to sue is the question of
whether the defendant has assets within that jurisdiction, and if not, whether
the judgment obtained from the jurisdiction is enforceable in the country
where such assets are to be found.
Singapore, like many other common law countries, can assert jurisdiction
over a defendant if he is present in,1 or if he has submitted to,2 the
jurisdiction. International tort cases present problems for both. The
defendant may have minimal or no dealing within the jurisdiction. For
example, defective goods may be distributed by a foreign manufacturer
without any presence within the jurisdiction, or a negligent
misrepresentation may be made by a foreign firm having no business within
the jurisdiction, to a party in the jurisdiction. In many cases, the parties do
not have a pre-existing contractual relationship in which to submit to the
jurisdiction in advance, and even if they have such a relationship, it is a
matter of interpretation3 whether the jurisdiction clause, if there is one,
will also cover the dispute in tort.4
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S 16(1)(a)(i), Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322,1985 Rev Ed), and O 10, Rules
of the Supreme Court (Cap 322, R 5,1990 Ed). S 19(3)(a)(i), Subordinate Courts Act (Cap
321, 1985 Rev Ed), and O 10, Rules of the Subordinate Court (Cap 321, R 1, 1993 Ed).
S 16(1)(b), Supreme Court of Judicature Act, ibid. S 19(3)(b), Subordinate Courts Act,
ibid.
Governed presumably by the proper law of the contract containing the jurisdiction clause:
Cheshire & North, Private International Law (12th ed, 1992), at 237.
See, eg, the restrictive attitude in: Peterson v AB Bahco Ventilation (1980) 107 DLR (3d)
49, 56; Mohamad Toufik Al-Ozeir & Anor v American Express Bank Ltd [1994] 2 MLJ
687, 691; Contra Continental Bank NA v Aeokos Cia Naviera SA [1994] 2 All ER 540.
In many cases the plaintiff has to resort to service out of jurisdiction.
Order 11 Rule 15 spells out many grounds under which the plaintiff can
apply for leave to serve process outside the jurisdiction, e.g., where the
defendant is domiciled, ordinarily resident, carrying on business or has
property, within the jurisdiction.6 The purpose of this article is to examine
the specific issues of jurisdiction arising with respect to tort litigation,7 and
the focus will be on the heads which have a direct bearing on tort actions.
II. ORDER 11 GROUNDS FOR TORT ACTIONS
Under Order 11 Rule 1(f),8 leave of the court for service out of jurisdiction
may be applied for if in the action –
(i) the claim is founded on a tort committed in Singapore; or
(ii) the claim is wholly or partly founded on, or is for the recovery
of damages in respect of, damage suffered in Singapore caused
by a tortious act or omission wherever occurring.
Rule 1(f) replaces the old rule which only allowed for service out of
jurisdiction in cases where the claim was founded on a tort committed
within Singapore. Another relevant provision for tort actions is Rule 1(p)
where “the claim is founded on a cause of action arising in Singapore”.
III. PRE-REQUISITES FOR SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION
Order 11 is an extension of the common law grounds of jurisdiction, and
courts generally view applications under it with caution, because the purpose
of the exercise is to compel a defendant abroad, owing no necessary
allegiance to the jurisdiction, to trial within the jurisdiction, and also because
the grounds of jurisdiction are wider than that which the forum recognises
in foreign courts.9 The plaintiff has to show a good arguable case that the
claim falls within the specific head of Order 11.10 The action must fall
within the letter and spirit of the rule.11 It has also been said that any
doubts as to whether a claim falls within a head of jurisdiction should be
Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC), supra, note 1; S 278/93; S 299/93. See also, Rules of
the Subordinate Court, supra, note 1; S 279/93; S 298/93.
O 11 r 1(a) RSC.
This article does not deal with admiralty jurisdiction, for which, see High Court (Admiralty
Jurisdiction) Act (Cap 123, 1985 Rev Ed).
Supra, note 5.
Mackenda v Feldia AG [1967] 2 QB 590, 599, per Diplock LJ; The Chapparal [1968] 2
Lloyd’s Rep 158, 163, per Diplock LJ; George Monro Ltd v American Cyanamid and
Chemical Corporation [1944] KB 432, 437, per Scott LJ.
Seaconsar Far East Ltd v Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran [1993] 3 WLR 756; [1993]
3 All ER 756.
Johnson v Taylor Bros [1920] AC 144.
2 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1995)
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resolved in favour of the defendant.12 Because the application is ex parte,
there must also be full and frank disclosure.13
The plaintiff also has to show that there is a serious question to be tried
on the merits.14 The degree of difficulty for the plaintiff at this stage depends
on the ground that is being invoked. If the ground has a direct bearing on
the substance of the claim (eg, Rule 1(f)), as opposed to the general ground
of the domicil or residence of the defendant, the plaintiff would have
already gone into the question of the claim on the basis of a good arguable
case, so that he has nothing left to show.15 On the other hand, if a general
ground has been invoked, then the question of merits must be independently
assessed. Finally, it must also be shown that Singapore is the natural forum
to hear the action.16 In tort cases, the place where the tort is committed has
generally been considered a critical pointer determining the natural forum.17
IV. TORT COMMITTED WITHIN THE JURISDICTION
This phrase has spawned sufficient varying interpretations, conflicting
authorities, and academic commentary to earn the dubious honour of being
arguably the most complex ground of Order 11 and generating some of the
most difficult issues in the conflict of laws.
Before the relevant authorities are examined, it is necessary to point out
the relationship between the place of the tort as a jurisdiction concept, and
as a choice of law concept. The question of where a tort is committed
arises both in a jurisdictional and a choice of law context, and even in
jurisdictional litigation, the issue can arise in a choice of law context. Many
countries utilise the law of the place of the tort as at least one connecting
factor to determine choice of law.18 In jurisdictional litigation, the place of
the tort can be relevant in two ways apart from being the basis of obtaining
jurisdiction. It is itself relevant for determining the natural forum. Moreover,
the applicable law may also be a relevant indicator of the natural forum,19
and to that end the place of tort needs to be identified to determine choice
The Siskina [1979] AC 210. But contra Carter (1981) 52 BYBIL 319, 320.
The Hagen [1908] P 189.
Seaconsar Far East Ltd v Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran, supra, note 10.
Seaconsar Far East Ltd, supra, note 10. Subject to choice of law considerations, see infra,
Part VI.
The Albaforth [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 91; The Spiliada [1987] AC 460; JH Raynor (Mincing
Lane) Ltd v Teck Hock & Co (Pte) Ltd [1990] 2 MLJ 142. This article only deals with
the issue of forum conveniens insofar as tort claims raise special considerations. For a
fuller discussion of the doctrine as such, see D Chong, “Forum Conveniens” (1993) 5
SAcLJ 1.
Infra, Part VII.
This will be true for jurisdictions following Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356 or some
variation of it, and that includes almost the entire Commonwealth.
Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538; The Spiliada, supra, note 16.
7 S.Ac.L.J. Jurisdiction Issues in International Tort Litigation 3
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
of law.20 The authorities, however, reveal that cases on jurisdiction are
considered authoritative on choice of law questions.21 This also suggests
that the cases on choice of law will also be considered relevant to
jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind the material differences
between the jurisdictional and choice of law concepts. First, the question
in jurisdictional litigation is whether the tort is committed within the
jurisdiction, and the court need not go further, while in choice of law a
specific location must be found for the tort. Secondly in jurisdiction cases,
the court has a discretion whether to grant leave for service out of
jurisdiction, while there is no discretion in choice of law. As a matter of
policy, the locus delicti for jurisdiction and that for choice of law do not
necessarily have to coincide.22 In jurisdiction cases, the search is primarily
for the court which is most closely connected to the case in a procedural
sense (eg, the location of evidence and witnesses), but in choice of law, the
considerations must be substantive. In the jurisdiction context the forum
always has some interest in hearing the case where the effects of the tort
are felt within the jurisdiction, but when it comes to choice of law, it may
not necessarily want to apply its own law. In other words, it may be possible
to say that the tort is committed in more than one place for jurisdiction
purposes,23 but it can only have a single location for choice of law purposes.
Where that is the case the interchangeability of concepts must be highly
suspect.24
A. The Place of the Tort
One classical approach has been to fix the locus delicti at the place where
the defendant acted.25 This emphasises the regulatory aspects of tort law.
Today the justification has more to do with fairness to the defendant as
reflected in the maxim, locus regit actum. Another classical approach is to
localise the tort at the place of damage. The damage completes the tort
The place of the tort can also be relevant in yet another way: see infra, Part VI.
Metall und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc [1990] 1 QB 391; Armagas
Ltd v Mundogas SA [1986] AC 717; Church of Scientology v Metropolitan Police
Commissioner (1976) 120 Sol Jo 690; Voth v Manlldra Flour Mills Pty Ltd, supra, note
19.
Carter (1979) 50 SYBIL 241, 242-243.
As in Canada and Ireland – see infra, Section B.
Contra Interprovincial Co-operative v The Queen (1975) 53 DLR (3d) 321, where a
minority in the Canadian Supreme Court applied the jurisdiction test in choice of law.
See Collins,“Where is the Locus Delicti?” (1975) 24 ICLQ 325, 328.
Eg, many of the older Canadian cases looked to the place of acting: Anderson v Nobel’s
Explosive Co (1906) 12 OLR 644 (where explosives were manufactured in Scotland and
sold in Ontario and caused injury there, the tort was committed in Scotland); Beck v
Willard Chocolate Co Ltd [1924] 2 DLR 1140 (where chocolates negligently manufactured
in Ontario caused injury in Nova Scotia, the tort was committed in Ontario).
4 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1995)
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and it is only then that the cause of action arises and the tort can be said
to be committed. This “last-event” theory has close links with the now
debunked vested rights theory.26 It has been rejected by the Privy Council.27
The place of harm also finds support in the perception of tort law as a
compensatory vehicle, which therefore lays emphasis on the loss for which
compensation is sought. The main problem with these two approaches is
that the act or harm may occur over several localities. One approach that
had some judicial support is that all the ingredients of the tort must occur
within the jurisdiction,28 but the weight of authority is correctly against it.29
It would mean that no country would have jurisdiction over a tort spanning
several jurisdictions. An elective technique allows the plaintiff to choose
either the place of acting or place of harm.30 This method also suffers from
the definitional problems of the individual limbs in multiple-locality torts.31
The modern English and Australian approach is to use the substance of
the tort test. In the words of Lord Pearson in the Privy Council case of
Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Thompson:32 “The right approach is,
when the tort is complete, to look back over the series of events constituting
it and ask the question, where in substance did this cause of action arise?”
This test was developed in respect of “a cause of action which arose within
the jurisdiction”,33 but its application to a “tort committed within the
jurisdiction” is undoubtedly correct.34 It appears to be a general test for all
torts,35 but it has been emphasised that in its application each tort must be
separately considered to see where it is committed.36
Eg, in American Law Institute, Restatement on Conflict of Laws (1934) (First Restatement),
the place of wrong is the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for
an alleged tort takes place (§ 377). The author of the First Restatement was Beale, who
brought the vested rights theory to America. Under this theory, foreign law is applied
because rights are vested in foreign territory. As many have pointed out, the argument
is circular in assuming the relevance of the foreign legal system in the first place.
Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Thompson [1971] AC 458 (PC NSW).
Abbot-Smith v Governors of University of Toronto (1964) 45 DLR (2d) 672 (NS); Asprey
JA, Thompson v Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd [1968] 3 NSWLR 3.
This was also rejected in Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Thompson, supra, note 27.
Cook, Logical and Legal Basis of Conflict of Laws (1942), at 345. See Handelskwekerij
GJ Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA [1977] 3 WLR 479 in relation to the Brussels
Convention.
See, eg, Minster Investments Ltd v Hyundai Precision & Industry Co Ltd [1988] 2 Lloyd’s
Rep 621.
Supra, note 27, at 468.
S 18(4), Common Law Procedure Act (Act 21 of 1899) (NSW). Cf O 11 r 1(p) RSC in
Singapore.
Castree v ER Squib & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 1248; Buttigieg v Universal Terminal &
Stevedoring Corp [1972] VR 626, 628. Contra Asprey JA and Wallace P in Thompson v
Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd, supra, note 28.
It has been applied, inter alia, to negligence, defamation, inducement of breach of contract
and misrepresentation.
Diamond v Bank of London and Montreal Ltd [1979] QB 333, 346, per Lord Denning
MR.
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The clearest advantage of this test is that it does not necessarily put any
special significance to any particular element of the tort, although the
Board did express preference for the theory that “the cause of action arose
within the jurisdiction if the act on the part of the defendant, which gives
the plaintiff his cause of complaint has occurred within the jurisdiction.”37
The act and the harm in that case were found to have occurred within the
jurisdiction, and it reserved its opinion in cases where they occurred in
different places. The Distillers test is meant to be a flexible approach: “...
the search is for the most appropriate court to try the action, and the
degree of connection between the cause of action and the country concerned
should be the determining factor.”38 The question is not whether it is flexible,
but how flexible it is. In Canada, it has evolved into a teleological approach.39
In England and Australia, the courts have taken a more traditional approach
that attempts to isolate the gist of the action. However the authorities are
not easy to reconcile. For the purpose of this article, three problematic
areas will be examined.
I. Negligence
It was essentially in this area that the “substance of the tort” test developed.
In the Distillers case,40 the British defendant had imported the drug
thalidomide from Germany, manufactured a soporific containing that drug,
and sold it in England to an Australian company that sold it in New South
Wales, where the plaintiff’s mother had bought and ingested it during her
pregnancy, causing the plaintiff to be born with deformed limbs. The Privy
Council held that the cause of action arose in New South Wales because
the act of the defendant which gave the plaintiff the cause for complaint
was the distribution of the drug in New South Wales without warning of
possible side-effects for pregnant women. Significantly, the damage was
also suffered in the forum.41
In Castree v ER Squib & Sons Ltd,42 a machine had been manufactured in
Germany by the defendants, but was sold in England to the employer of
the plaintiff. The plaintiff was injured in England when the machine
disintegrated. The Court of Appeal held that the alleged tort was committed
within the jurisdiction because the “substantial wrongdoing” of the
defendant was “putting on the English market a defective machine with no
warning as to its defects.”43 In Jacobs v Australian Abrasives Pty Ltd,44 the
Supra, note 27, at 468.
Supra, note 27, at 467.
Infra, Section B.
Supra, note 27.
Lord Denning MR opined that the basis of Distillers was in fact that the damage was
suffered there: Diamond v Bank of London and Montreal, supra, note 36, at 346.
Supra, note 34.
Supra, note 34, at 1252.
[1971] Tas SR 92.
6 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1995)
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
plaintiff alleged in the Tasmanian court that a grinding wheel manufactured
in New South Wales and bought in the forum had broken and injured the
plaintiff in the forum. The judge45 held that the tort had been committed
in Tasmania, because the defendant had failed to warn the ultimate
consumer of the defects in the product.
In contrast, there are cases where the courts have been less generous to
the plaintiff. In George Monro Ltd v American Cyanamid and Chemical
Corp,46 rat-poison was sold by the defendant to the first plaintiff in New
York, who in turn purveyed it to the second plaintiff who sold it to a
farmer in England. The poison devastated the farm, and the plaintiffs were
attempting to recover from the defendant the compensation paid to the
farmer. Although the Court of Appeal also purported to apply the
“substance of the tort” test,47 it considered in obiter dicta48 that the act of
selling the poison without warning as to its defects occurred in New York.
However, this case has generally been distinguished,49 or not followed.50 In
Buttigieg v Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp,51 where it was alleged
that improper stowage of cargo in New York caused the plaintiff to be
injured in Melbourne, it was held that the tort was committed in New
York. Crockett J held, applying the “substance” test, that the allegation
that the defendant had failed to warn of the dangers caused by improper
stowage was “unreal”, and the gist of the action was the negligent stowage
in New York. In MacGregor v Application des Gaz,52 the allegation was
that a defective lamp manufactured in France was sold in Queensland
without warning as to its dangers, causing the plaintiff to be injured in
Queensland. Matthews J in the Brisbane Supreme Court held that these
allegations were “unreal and artificial” and having regard to the substance
of the action, the tort was one of defective manufacture committed in
France.
There has been an undoubted emphasis in all these cases on where the
defendant acted. Indeed the Privy Council in Distillers had stressed the
justice of making the defendant answer for his wrongdoing in the place
where he did the wrong.53 However, the characterisation of the act does
present problems. There is indeed some artifice in saying that the
manufacturer is negligent in failing to warn of defective products. Taking
this approach, any kind of product liability negligence can be characterised
Burbury CJ in Chambers.
[1944] KB 432.
In that sense it was a precursor to the Distillers decision.
The pleadings in the case were so badly drafted as to justify dismissal on that basis alone.
Eg, Diamond v Bank of London and Montreal Ltd, supra, note 36, where it was confined
to negligent acts, having no application to misrepresentation.
Eg, Moran v Pyle National (Canada) Ltd (1974) 43 DLR (3d) 239.
Supra, note 34.
[1976] Qd R 175.
Supra, note 27, at 468.
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as a tort occurring where the injury occurs.54 It is a question of degree how
offensive it is to common sense, and a question of the extent to which the
court is prepared to look beyond the plaintiff’s allegations. There is
admittedly less contortion when a product that is otherwise safe is dangerous
if used by particular persons (eg, the drug in Distillers). In such a case a
reasonable manufacturer should know about the side-effects and should
have put out a warning. But if a product is defectively manufactured, then
cases like Castree v ER Squib & Sons Ltd require the case to be argued on
the basis that the reasonable manufacturer should have known which
products are defective, and attached warnings to them. Put at a higher
level of abstraction, when a defendant creates a dangerous situation (eg,
the improper stowage in Buttigieg), he ought reasonably to know about the
danger and therefore ought to have given due warning to anyone coming
into it. Thus it is not surprising that the “failure to warn” technique has
been described as nothing more than a “device”.55
II. Misrepresentation
In Cordova Land Co v Victor Bros Inc,56 a fraudulent representation was
alleged to have been made by the defendants to the plaintiffs in England.
The representation, contained in bills of lading, were issued and handed
over to shippers in Boston. The plaintiff had received and acted on them
in England. The English High Court found that the substance of the
wrongdoing occurred in Boston. On the other hand, in Diamond v Bank
of London and Montreal,57 the English Court of Appeal held that for the
purpose of service out of jurisdiction, where fraudulent or negligent
misrepresentations are made by telephone or telex originating from outside
the jurisdiction, the substance of the tort is committed in England where
they were received and acted upon.58 The Cordova case was distinguished
on the basis that there the representation was made in Boston generally to
whoever might receive the bill of lading, but the representations in the
present case were specific and directed to the plaintiffs in England. However,
the Diamond rule is not a rigid one. It may not apply if the place of acting
is fortuitous, and cannot apply if the receipt and the reliance occur in
different countries.59
Collins, “Some Aspects of Service Out of Jurisdiction in English Law” (1972) 21 ICLQ
657, 666.
Fawcett, “Product Liability in Private International Law: A European Perspective” (1993)
I Hague 9, 201.
[1966] 1 WLR 793.
Supra, note 36.
Followed in The Albaforth, supra, note 16. See, in the choice of law context, Armagas Ltd
v Mundogas SA, supra, note 21.
Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd, supra, note 19, at 568–569, 579.
Singapore Academy of Law Journal8 (1995)
54
55
56
57
58
59
In contrast, in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd,60 where the defendant,
based in Missouri, had given improper professional advice to the plaintiff
in New South Wales, the High Court of Australia held61 that, although the
alleged act of negligence in the case could be characterised either as
negligent misrepresentation,62 or the negligent provision of services, on the
facts of the case the substance of the action was the latter, and therefore
the tort took place in Missouri. It was stressed that, following Distillers, “it
is some act of the defendant, and not its consequences, that must be the
focus of attention.”63 On the other hand, Brennan J thought, following the
English authorities,64 that the consequences of the defendant’s act were
more important. Dissenting, his Honour preferred to classify the action as
misrepresentation, taking place in the forum.65
The pattern that emerges is that the Australian court will place considerable
importance on where the defendant actually acted, at least where the
representation is a part of services rendered,66 while the English courts
exhibit a greater tendency to look at consequential acts. This is confirmed
in Minster Investments Ltd v Hyundai Precision & Industry Co Ltd.67 In a
slightly different context,68 Steyn J in the English High Court held that in
an action under Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd69 for
negligent misrepresentation, the essence of the action is the misstatement
and reliance, and “not the historical carelessness which led to the
misstatement or wrong advice.”70
There are two recent High Court cases from Malaysia on negligent provision
of advice, but unfortunately neither is very helpful. In Tengku Aishah binti
Sultan Hj Ahmad Shah v Wardley Ltd,71 the Malaysian plaintiffs entered
Supra, note 19.
By Mason CJ, Dean, Dawson and Gaudron JJ. Toohey J agreed on this point.
The majority had assumed that if the tort was characterised as misrepresentation, then
it would take place in New South Wales. Brennan J (dissenting) dealt with the question
in greater detail and held that a misrepresentation takes place when received and acted
upon.
Supra, note 19, at 567.
Diamond v Bank of London and Montreal, supra, note 36; The Albaforth, supra, note 16;
Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA, supra, note 21; Metall und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson
Lufkin & Jenrette Inc, supra, note 21.
Supra, note 19, at 578–579.
But see Cheshire & North, supra, note 3, at 556, who support the approach in Voth v
Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd, supra, note 19.
Supra, note 31.
The documents containing the alleged misrepresentations had been produced in France
and South Korea, and received by the plaintiff and acted upon in England. The question
was whether England was “where the harmful event occurred” under the Civil Jurisdiction
and Judgments Act 1982 (s 5(3), Sch 1). Nevertheless Steyn J applied the substance of
the tort test to hold that it was: supra, note 31, at 624.
[1964] AC 465.
Supra, note 31, at 624.
[1992] 2 CLJ 1278.
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into a contract with the defendant, a merchant banker operating in
Singapore. The defendant agreed to lend money to the plaintiffs and to
render advice relating to the loan. Dato’Siti Norma Yaakob J applied the
“substance of the tort” test and found the alleged tort to be that of failing
to render the banking service of giving advice, and thus characterised, the
tort was held to be committed in Singapore. This case was reversed by an
unreported Supreme Court judgment, but the reasons for the reversal are
not known to this writer.72 More recently, in Mohamad Toufik Al-Ozeir &
Anor v American Express Bank Ltd,73 on virtually identical facts, Abdul
Malek J characterised the tort as misrepresentation, and following the
Diamond v Bank of London and Montreal Ltd74 test, found the tort to be
committed within Malaysia. The point was, however, conceded by counsel.75
III. Inducing Breach of Contract
In Atlantic Underwriting Agencies Ltd v Compagnia di Assicurazione di
Milano SPA,76 the defendant’s act that was alleged to constitute the
inducement to breach the contract took place in Italy, but the harm was
suffered in England. Lloyd J found the alleged tort to have been committed,
if at all, in Italy. No reference was made to the place where consequential
act of the induced breach of contract occurred.77 However, in Metall und
Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc,78 where the acts of
inducement occurred in New York causing breaches of contract and
economic loss to the plaintiff in England, the Court of Appeal held, after
careful consideration, that the tort was committed in the forum.79 This case
illustrates that the place where the defendant actually acted is not necessarily
the governing consideration in the substance of the tort test.
B. Alternative Approaches
i. Significant Elements Within the Jurisdiction
The Irish court has taken a different interpretation to the phrase “tort
committed within the jurisdiction”, at least where the act and the harm
occur in separate jurisdictions. In Patrick Grehan v Medical Inc and Valley
Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1995)10
11 November 1993 vide Supreme Court Civil Appeal No 01-79-91: see Mohamad Toufik’s
case, infra, note 73, at 692.
[1994] 2 MLJ 687.
Supra, note 36.
Supra, note 73, at 691.
[1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 240.
Indeed it is difficult to determine what that place is, since the judge had proceeded on
the hypothesis that the tort had indeed taken place without discussing what constituted
the induced breach of contract.
Supra, note 21.
However, in the analogous tort of intimidation, it had been assumed without argument
that the tort was committed where the acts of inducement took place: Philips J in Dimskal
Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers Federation, The Evia Luck (No 2)
[1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 166.
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
Pine Associates,80 the plaintiff had been injured in Ireland by a heart valve
alleged to have been defectively manufactured in the United States. It
might have been said that, following Castree v ER Squib & Sons Ltd81 the
tort was one of selling defective heart valves in Ireland without warning as
to its defects. Instead, the Supreme Court held that it was “sufficient if any
significant element [of the tort] has occurred within the jurisdiction.”82
This achieves by judicial means the statutory reform in England. In England,
service out of jurisdiction is now permissible “if in the action begun by writ
... (f) the claim is founded on a tort and the damage was sustained, or
resulted from an act committed, within the jurisdiction”.83 In Metall und
Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc,84 the Court of Appeal
held that to satisfy the first limb, it was enough if some significant damage
has been sustained in the jurisdiction. As for the second limb, the Court
held that it “requires the court to look at the tort alleged in a common
sense way and ask whether damage has resulted from substantial and
efficacious acts committed within the jurisdiction (whether or not other
substantial and efficacious acts have been committed elsewhere).”85
ii. Real and Substantial Connection
In Moran v Pyle National (Canada) Ltd,86 the Supreme Court of Canada
chose to read Distillers merely as an example of the real and substantial
connection test. Dickson J, delivering the judgment of the court, was
prepared to consider a tort to have occurred within the jurisdiction if it is
substantially affected by the defendant’s activities and its consequences
and the law of which is likely to have been in the reasonable contemplation
of the parties. As applied to the issue of product liability that arose in that
case:
... where a foreign defendant carelessly manufactures a product in a
foreign jurisdiction which enters into the normal channels of trade
and he knows or ought to know both that as a result of his carelessness
a consumer may well be injured and it is reasonably foreseeable that
the product would be used or consumed where the plaintiff used or
consumed it, then the forum in which the plaintiff suffered damage
is entitled to exercise judicial jurisdiction over that foreign defendant.87
[1986] IR 528.
Supra, note 34. See supra, main text following note 42.
Supra, note 80, at 542, per Walsh J (original emphasis), Finlay CJ and Giffen J concurring.
See also, Collins, supra, note 24, at 327-328.
O 11 r 1(1)(f) RSC.
Supra, note 21.
Supra, note 21, at 437.
(1974) 43 DLR (3d) 239.
Ibid, at 250-251. For academic support, see Bisset-Johnson, “Jurisdiction over the
Manufacturer of Imported Goods in Cases of Negligence — The British Commonwealth
Approach” (1970) 48 Can Bar Rev 548.
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C. When is a Tort Committed within Singapore?
Should Singapore adopt the flexible approaches of Ireland or Canada? In
Moran v Pyle National (Canada) Ltd,88 and the cases following it,89 the
place where the damage occurred played a significant role in the application
of the real and substantial connection test. The same can be said of the
significant elements test in Patrick Grehan v Medical Inc and Valley Pine
Associates.90 To that extent, a place of damage rule like Singapore’s Order
11 Rule 1(f)(ii) will give effect to much of the underlying policy. Indeed,
the adoption of the latter interpretation will render Rule 1(f)(ii) superfluous.
The Canadian approach goes further in having an additional protective
mechanism of foreseeability for the defendant. The foreseeability element,
though relevant,91 has not been elevated to a test92 in Anglo-Australian
jurisprudence, and neither is it reflected in Singapore’s Order 11 Rule
1(f)(ii). These judicial approaches are attempts to overcome the problems
posed by the narrow jurisdictional ground of tort committed within the
jurisdiction, and does not fit in the structure of the new Order 11 Rule 1(f).
However, the issue of foreseeability can still be relevant when considering
the question of forum conveniens.
It appears that the Anglo-Australian substance of the tort test, in spite of
its difficulties, will probably be followed. It reflects the finest balance
between certainty and flexibility that is achievable in the circumstances. It
is difficult, if not dangerous, to attempt to generalise from the authorities
examined above. It does seem that the English and Australian courts have
chosen to emphasise different aspects of the Distillers test. The Australian
courts stress the defendant’s acts in its characterisation of the tort.93 The
English approach gravitates towards the consequences of the defendant’s
Supra, note 86. The plaintiff’s husband died in the forum allegedly as a result of defective
manufacture of an electric lamp outside the jurisdiction.
Peterson v AB Bahco Ventilation (1980) 107 DLR (3d) 49 (tort of conspiracy and fraud
took place within the jurisdiction where the victims were resident and sustained damage
there, and the subject matter of the fraud were sold and distributed there); Ichi Canada
Ltd v Yamauchi Rubber Industry Co (1983) 144 DLR (3d) 533 (tort of inducing breach
of contract occurred within the jurisdiction where the plaintiff suffered economic loss
within the jurisdiction); Elguindy v Core Laboratories Canada Ltd (1987) 60 OR (2d) 151
(tort of inducing breach of contract occurred within the jurisdiction where induced acts
and damage happened in the jurisdiction).
Supra, note 80.
See, eg, Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Ltd, supra, note 19, at 568, and Diamond v Bank
of London and Montreal Ltd, supra, note 36. Foreseeability is also an important
consideration in the New Zealand position, although the wording of the relevant statute
is different: see Biddulph v Wyeth Australia Pty Ltd [1994] 3 NZLR 49, 55.
See, eg, Buttigieg v Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp, supra, note 34, and MacGregor
v Application des Gaz, supra, note 52.
But see Sykes & Pryles, Australian Private International Law (3rd ed, 1991), at 41,
where the authors support a more flexible approach, not unlike that mentioned
supra, in Section B.
12 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1995)
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acts,94 and even when it does stress the defendant’s acts, it also
recharacterises the tort to bring the acts and consequences together.95
Ultimately, it is a matter of what the judges conceive to be the
characteristics96 and nature97 of, and what are the important policy
considerations98 in, each kind of tort. A certain amount of subjectivity is
probably inevitable. On the whole the test is able to achieve certainty in
simple cases, while retaining sufficient flexibility for complex ones.
The forum has a strong interest in allowing those who are injured within
its territory to sue defendants from abroad. While it may be argued to be
unfair to force the defendant to come to the forum if he did not act there,
it does not seem unfair if the effects of his act are felt there. On the other
hand, it does not follow that the foreign defendant should therefore be
subject to the substantive tort laws of the forum.99 However, the combination
of the interchangeability of the jurisdictional and choice of law concepts of
the locus delicti100  and the rule that choice of law considerations are
irrelevant when the tort is committed within the jurisdiction101 has this
unfortunate effect. As the head of jurisdiction then stood, the only avenue
for the plaintiff to sue the foreign defendant102 in the forum also led to the
certainty of subjecting the foreigner to the exclusive application of the
local law. This is highly undesirable. However, the availability of an
alternative ground of jurisdiction based on damage within the jurisdiction
ought to lead to greater sensitivity to the choice of law implications of
locating the tort within the forum in order to found jurisdiction. Hence, it
is likely that there will be greater recourse to the new basis of jurisdiction
based on damage occurring within the forum.
V. DAMAGE SUSTAINED WITHIN THE JURISDICTION
Unhappiness with the substance of the tort test led to the judicial re-
interpretation and statutory reform discussed above. Some jurisdictions
have added a new ground of jurisdiction based on damage suffered within
the jurisdiction instead of replacing the ground of “tort committed within
As can be seen from the misrepresentation and inducement of breach of contract cases.
Castree v ER Squib & Sons Ltd, supra, note 34. See also, supra, main text following note
42.
See also, Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: a Comparative Study (2nd ed, 1945), Vol 2, at
301–333.
Eg, the essence of tort law may be its regulatory aspect (Fridman, “Where is a Tort
Committed” (1974) 24 UTLJ 247, 262–263) or its compensatory aspect (Morse, Torts in
Private International Law (1978), at 119).
Eg, the use of foreseeability as a policy consideration in Canada. On this point, see also,
Rabel, supra, note 96, at 332–333.
Although that may or may not turn out to his disadvantage.
See supra, note 21.
Metall und Rohstoff AC v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc, supra, note 21; Szalatnay-
Stacho v Fink [1947] KB 1. See also, RJ Sneddon v AG Shafe [1947] MLJ 197.
Assuming that the defendant has no other contact with the jurisdiction.
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the jurisdiction” with a new test.103 The main concern is that the application
of the Distillers test may not enable the forum to exercise jurisdiction even
though the resident of the forum suffers damage within the forum.104 There
are differences of phraseology in the implementation, and the Singapore
version in Order 11 Rule 1(f)(ii) is perhaps closest to, but not the same as,
the New South Wales provision. No cases have been decided in Singapore
on the new rule, and recourse must be had to cases from Australia and
Canada on its meaning.
A. Does “Damage” Include Consequential Damage?
The first issue that arises is whether “damage” includes consequential
damage. The weight of the Commonwealth authorities is in favour of a
broad interpretation. The New South Wales Court of Appeal in Flaherty
v Girgis105  was faced with this issue. McHugh JA held:106 “Damage ... is to
be contrasted with the element necessary to complete a cause of action; it
includes all the detriment, physical, financial and social which the plaintiff
suffers as the result of the tortious conduct of the defendant.”
In Australia, it has been held that the damage had been suffered within the
jurisdiction in the case of a resident who was injured and hospitalised
outside the forum but returned home, because of the continuing need for
medical attention and the loss of earning capacity suffered in the forum.107
To the same effect are the Canadian authorities.108 Where pecuniary losses
are suffered in the jurisdiction, damage has also occurred within the
jurisdiction.109 These decisions give effect to the forum’s interest in allowing
persons injured therein to sue persons outside the jurisdiction. It is very
likely that these authorities, which seem to be sound, will be followed in
Singapore.
See, eg, Australia: New South Wales, Victoria, Northern Territory – see Sykes & Pryles,
Australian Private International Law, supra, note 93, at 43; Canada: Ontario, New
Brunswick – see Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws (2nd ed, 1986), at 123.
See Flaherty v Girgis (1985) 4 NSWLR 248.
Ibid. The decision was affirmed by the High Court (1988) 71 ALR 1. The issues relating
to the meaning of the rule were not contested in the High Court, but the Court did note
that the conclusion of the Court of Appeal was supportable. The constitutionality of the
jurisdiction rule was contested in and upheld in the High Court.
Supra, note 104, at 266. Kirby P and Samuels J concurred on this point.
Flaherty v Girgis, supra, note 104. See also, Challenor v Douglas [1983] 2 NSWLR 405
and Brix-Neilson v Oceaneering Australia Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 173.
Vile v Von Wendt (1980) 103 DLR (3d) 356; Poirier v Williston (1980) 113 DLR (3d) 252.
Vile v Von Wendt, ibid (loss of wages and business profits due to personal injury);
Bouchard v J L Le Saux, Ltée (1984) 45 OR (2d) 792 (wife’s pecuniary loss as a result
of loss of her husband); Poirier v Williston (1980) 113 DLR (3d) 252 (loss of income due
to personal injury); Skyrotors v Carriere Technical Industries (1979) 102 DLR (3d) 323
(economic loss due to inducement of breach of contract occurred at head office where
the financial records were kept).
14 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1995)
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B. Must the Damage in the Jurisdiction be Significant?
The English Court of Appeal in Metall und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson
Lufkin & Jenrette Inc qualified the word “damage” in the English Order
11 with“significant”.110 The Australian and Canadian authorities have not
dealt with this issue. It might be argued that because leave for service out
of jurisdiction is discretionary anyway, a wide meaning should be given.
But it is submitted that if the damage within the jurisdiction is insignificant,
then there is no sound basis for the forum to assert jurisdiction on this
ground, and the defendant should not be put to argument on forum non
conveniens. Although the English provision is worded differently, the
reasoning in Metall und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc
is nevertheless persuasive:“But it would certainly contravene the spirit,
and also we think the letter, of the rule if jurisdiction were assumed on the
strength of some relatively minor or insignificant act having been committed
here, perhaps fortuitously.”111 This reasoning applies equally to damage.
C. Can an Action Proceed for Damage Outside the Jurisdiction When
Damage is also Suffered within the Jurisdiction?
This issue raises a unique problem in Singapore. In Flaherty v Girgis,112  an
argument was also made that the jurisdiction could be founded in respect
only of the damage that was suffered within the jurisdiction. At that time,
the relevant provision was that leave could be applied for “where the
proceedings are founded on, or are for the recovery of, damage suffered
wholly or partly in the State caused by a tortious act or omission wherever
occurring”.113 The provision did not make clear whether the proceedings
must be in relation only to the damage in the jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
McHugh JA held that the provision was applicable for the “recovery of
damage caused by a tortious act or omission wherever occurring if either
the whole or the part of that damage was suffered in New South Wales.”114
This provision has since been changed. Presently, leave for service out of
jurisdiction may be given “where the proceedings, wholly or partly, are
founded on, or are for the recovery of damages in respect of, damage
suffered in the State caused by a tortious act or omission wherever
occurring.”115 This endorses the judicial interpretation in Flaherty v Girgis.
Supra, note 21, at 437.
Supra, note 21, at 437.
Supra, note 104.
Supreme Court Rules1970, Pt 10 r 1(1)(e). Counsel and the Court accepted that “recovery
of damage” should read “recovery of damages in respect of damage” to make sense of
the provision.
Supra, note 104, at 267. Kirby P and Samuels J concurred on this point.
See, eg, Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd, supra, note 19.
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In the Singapore Rule 1(f)(ii), the word “is” appears twice,116 so that
grammatically the phrase “wholly or partly” qualifies only the first of the
two limbs thus:
the claim
is wholly or partly founded on, or
is for the recovery of damages in respect of,
damage suffered in Singapore caused by a tortious act or omission wherever
occurring.
The judicial route taken by Flaherty v Girgis does not seem to be open to
the Singapore courts when there is an express statutory qualification on
only one of the limbs. Hence, whether the claim is confined to the harm
suffered in Singapore must depend on the nature of the alleged tort. The
first limb deals with torts derived from the old action on the case, where
damage completes the cause of action so that the tort is founded on it,
while the second limb deals with torts where damage is not part of the
cause of action. Hence, in an action for negligence, where damage is partly
suffered in Singapore and partly abroad, the plaintiff can claim for his
entire losses under the rule. But if the action is in trespass the plaintiff can
only sue in respect of the damage suffered within the jurisdiction. It is
uncertain whether this distinction is intended. In principle there is no cause
for the distinction. In contrast, in the amended New South Wales provision,
the phrase “wholly or partly” clearly qualifies both limbs. The same effect
can be achieved in the local provision by a minor legislative amendment
so that it reads: “the claim is, wholly or partly, founded on, or for the
recovery of damages in respect of, damage suffered in Singapore caused by
a tortious act or omission wherever occurring.”
VI. CHOICE OF LAW ISSUES AT THE JURISDICTION STAGE
The approach of the English Court of Appeal to the question in jurisdiction
in Metall und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc117 was to
consider whether there was a “tort” in the private international sense, ie,
by the application of the choice of law rules.118 Under the English Order
11, it must first be shown that there is a “claim founded in tort” and “tort”
is used in the choice of law sense. This line of reasoning might have been
considered irrelevant to Singapore under the previous Order 11 Rule 1(1)(f)
because once the tort is committed within the jurisdiction choice of law
rules are irrelevant anyway.119 This same argument can also be made for
See main text after supra, note 8.
Supra, note 21.
The reasoning in the case is far from clear. Slade LJ appeared to consider choice of law
relevant to the question of whether there was a good arguable case that the case fell
within Order 11 as well as to the question of whether there was a good arguable case on
the merits (this was decided before Seaconsar Far East Ltd, supra, note 10).
See main text after supra, note 99.
116
117
118
119
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the present Order 11 Rule 1(f)(i), but it is to be noted that Rule 1(f)(ii)
requires“tortious” acts or omissions to occur, and not necessarily in the
jurisdiction. Even if they happen within the jurisdiction, the place of the
tort is not necessarily the forum when the Distillers test is applied. Hence
the question may arise whether“tortious” acts have indeed been committed
for the purposes of Rule 1(f)(ii).
If this reasoning in Metall und Rohstoff  is followed, then it is necessary to
determine the place where the tort is committed under Rule 1(f)(ii), because
only then can it be determined if the acts or omissions are tortious by the
private international law of the forum. Metall und Rohstoff has been
criticised for bringing unnecessary choice of law complications into
jurisdiction issues,120 but it also has its defenders.121 The main point in
favour of using the choice of law approach is that it can forestall unarguable
cases at the jurisdictional stage. After Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues
SA,122 which allowed actions based on totally foreign tort law in exceptional
circumstances, it can also be said that it prevents such tort claims from
failing at the jurisdiction threshold.
Cheshire & North chose to interpret123 the choice of law considerations in
Metall und Rohstoff as arising not in the issue of whether the claim fell
within the head of jurisdiction, but in the question of whether the plaintiff
had a good cause of action.124 This interpretation of the case puts the
plaintiff to proof at the standard of a serious question to be tried,125 instead
of a good arguable case.126 Indeed it may be questionable whether choice
of law questions are relevant at all if all the plaintiff has to show is that his
case is not unsustainable. However, it is submitted that choice of law
considerations have a bearing on whether the plaintiff has a serious question
to be tried, for what may be a frivolous claim by domestic law may turn
out not to be so by the application of choice of law rules. For example, if
a claim is based exclusively on the lex loci delicti, it will be unsustainable
if tested solely by the lex fori.127 Similarly, a claim sustainable by the lex
fori may turn out to be frivolous once choice of law methodology is
considered.128
Fentiman,“Tort – Jurisdiction or Choice of Law?” [1989] CLJ 191.
Tan,“Choice of Law in a Question of Jurisdiction” (1990) 32 Mai LR 363.
[1994] 3 WLR 926 (PC HK).
See comments in supra, note 118.
Cheshire & North, supra, note 3, at 191; Fawcett,“The Interrelationships of Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law in Private International Law” [1991] CLP 39, 42-43; Dicey & Morris,
Conflict of Laws (12th ed, 1993), at 341, footnote 88.
Seaconsar Far East Ltd v Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran, supra, note 10.
Seaconsar Far East Ltd, supra, note 10. Cheshire & North, supra, note 3, at 191, puts the
question as one of good arguable case, but that passage must now be read in the light
of Seaconsar Far East Ltd, supra, note 10.
127 See, eg, Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA, supra, note 122.
128 Eg, where there is no liability by the lex loci delicti, and no prospect of invoking the
exception.
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There is force in the view of the House of Lords in Seaconsar Far East Ltd
v Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran129 that jurisdictional considerations
should be kept apart from the merits of the claim. The question of whether
there is indeed a tort by private international law quite clearly goes to the
question of the strength of the plaintiff’s claim and it is therefore submitted
that the interpretation by Cheshire & North is to be preferred. Whatever
interpretive difficulties this may give rise to in England, in Singapore the
reasoning of Metall und Rohstoff could be distinguished because it
interpreted a different phrase, but its albeit unarticulated rationale could
be adopted for testing the merits of the claim. It will still be possible to
weed out totally unarguable cases at the jurisdiction stage. As for the
totally foreign tort, it will still fall within Rule 1(f)(ii) if the word“tortious”
is given a meaning wider than under domestic law,130 without actually
engaging the choice of law rules.
Another jurisdictional issue that may invoke choice of law considerations
is: what law determines where the tort is committed for the purpose of
Rule l(f)(i)? A further and related question is: what law governs the
question of where the tort is committed for the purpose of applying tort
choice of law rules (which may also be relevant at the jurisdiction stage)?
According to Metall und Rohstoff, the lexfori governs the second question.131
It is suggested that the lex fori answers both questions. In the first case, it
is a connecting factor for the court to assume jurisdiction.132 In the second
case it is a connecting factor leading to the application of the relevant
foreign law. In both cases, the question precedes the application of the
foreign law, and so the lex fori must be applied. Given the rule that the lex
fori applies exclusively to torts committed within the jurisdiction,133
realistically only the lex fori needs to be applied to determine whether
Rule 1(f)(i) is satisfied.134 For choice of law purposes, however, it does not
necessarily follow that the entire domestic law of the forum is applied in
determining the place of the tort. It will be impossible to apply such a test
to torts governed exclusively by foreign law.135 On the other hand, it goes
Supra, note 10.
In an enlightened lex fori approach: see Kahn-Freund, General Problems in Private
International Law (1980) 227–231. But contra The T S Havprins [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 356,
where Staughton J considered the lex fori domestic meaning to be applicable for the
meaning of “contract” for the contract heads of Order 11.
Supra, note 21, at 434. The court did not have to deal with the first question because it
was dealing with the new O 11 RSC.
See the reasoning (but not necessarily the conclusions) in The TS Havprins, supra, note
130, and The Andres Bonifacio [1993] 3 SLR 521, 530.
See main text, supra, after note 99.
On the assumption that the same test applies in respect of the locality of the tort for
jurisdiction and for choice of law purposes. See main text, supra, before and after note
22.
See, eg, Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA, supra, note 122. There would simply
be no elements of any legally recognisable tort to test for locality.
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too far to say that it is the foreign law’s test of locality of tort that is
determinative. That is circular because until the locality is determined, no
question of foreign tort law arises. In applying the test of the forum,136 it
is possible to take account of foreign law as datum. In the case of an
exclusively foreign tort, the elements of the foreign tort (as determined by
the foreign law) should be tested to determine where in substance the
foreign tort had allegedly occurred.
VII. FORUM CONVENIENS
The plaintiff must also show that the forum is the natural forum to hear
the case.137 It is to be noted that the substance of the tort test already takes
into account some consideration of appropriateness of the forum.138 In The
Albaforth,139the Court of Appeal held that where the tort has been found
to be committed within the jurisdiction, it must also be the natural forum
unless there are strong indicating factors otherwise. Where the jurisdiction
is argued on the basis of Rule 1(f)(i), this creates two stages in which to
test whether the case is an appropriate one to be tried in the forum. This
is far from ideal, but such problems are bound to inhere to a metaphysical
notion like the place of the tort. The purpose of the presumption is to
minimise the overlap between these two stages. Hence, the presumption is
desirable, provided the rationale for its existence is always borne in mind.
For example, conversion does not raise the complications of place of tort
like negligence. In one case where the tort of conversion was found to be
committed within Singapore, the High Court did not proceed to apply the
presumption that Singapore was thereby the natural forum, but found that
it was so only by a careful examination of the facts.140 As another example,
in cases of collision between ships in the territorial waters of a country the
strength of the presumption cannot be very strong.141 It does not follow
that the presumption has no place where jurisdiction is obtained under
Rule l(f)(ii). It may appear tortuous to determine the substance of the
tort, and then use it to raise the presumption of the natural forum. But the
court may need to determine the place of the tort anyway.142
Be it the substance of the tort test, or the significant elements test, or the real and
substantial connection test.
See cases cited in supra, note 16.
See main text at supra, note 38.
Supra, note 16.
JH Raynor (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Teck Hock & Co (Pte) Ltd, supra, note 16.
The Forum Craftsman [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 291. See also, The Planeta (Hong Kong
unreported judgment dated 18 January 1993), noted in Margolis,“Staying an Action
because the Foreign Law is Ambiguous” [1994] LMCLQ 30.
See supra, note 19, and Part VI.
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VIII. THE MOÇ   AMBIQUE RULE
The Moçambique rule prevents the English court from taking jurisdiction
over disputes over title to foreign land.143 The bases for the rule are restraint
from infringing foreign sovereignty and the unlikelihood of enforcement of
the judgment in the foreign territory.144 This common law rule also extends
to trespass to foreign land even when the title is not in dispute,145 but this
aspect of the rule has been legislatively abrogated in England.146 There is
no express adoption of the Moçambique rule under the Supreme Court of
Judicature Act,147 or in the Rules of the Supreme Court.148 A literal reading
might suggest that the prohibition no longer applies in Singapore. However,
this interpretation contradicts a basic tenet of private international law,
and for that reason, it is suggested that the Supreme Court of Judicature
Act be read purposively to be consistent with it.149 Indeed, the application
of the Moçambique rule in Singapore was recently accepted in the recent
case of Eng Liat Kiang v Eng Bak Hern.150 Although what was controverted
in that case was not the applicability of the rule in the light of the Supreme
Court of Judicature Act, but its exceptions in equity, the arguments against
the existence of the exceptions were rejected by Judith Prakash JC (as she
then was) with the observation that the Moçambique rule and its exceptions
were very well-established principles in the conflict of laws. On the other
hand, it is arguable that the extension of the rule to torts where the title
is not in dispute does not fall within the policy of the prohibition, and there
is no cogent reason to follow it.151
The Moçambique rule also applies to foreign intellectual property rights.152
It appears that under the present choice of law rules,153 a breach committed
abroad of foreign intellectual property law cannot be actionable as a tort
in the forum if the facts had occurred in the forum, due to territorial
British South Africa Co v Companhia de Moçambique [1893] AC 602. There are exceptions
in equity which are not in issue here: see Cheshire & North, supra, note 3, at 255-262.
Hesperides Hotels Ltd v Aegean Turkish Holidays Ltd [1979] AC 508; Duke v Andler
[1932] 4 DLR 429.
Hesperides Hotels Ltd v Aegean Turkish Holidays Ltd, ibid. The Moçambique rule does
not apply to in rem jurisdiction in respect of maritime torts: The Tolten [1946] P 135
(action to enforce maritime lien arising from damage by ship to foreign wharf).
S 30(1), Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982.
See s 16, supra, note 1.
Supra, note 5.
A recent application of this principle of statutory interpretation can be found in Arab
Bank Plc v Mercantile Holdings Ltd [1994] 2 WLR 307. See also, Tan,“Supreme Court
of Judicature (Amendment) Act 1993” [1993] SJLS 557, 563-566.
[1995] 1 SLR 577.
See also, Morse, supra, note 97, at 94.
Tyburn Productions Ltd v Conan Doyle [1991] Ch 75.
Boys v Chaplin, supra, note 18. Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA, supra, note
122.
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nature of such rights.154 Neither is a foreign breach of the forum’s intellectual
property laws actionable as a tort in the forum.155 Hence, as the law now
stands, there is both a jurisdictional and a choice of law bar to actions
based on breaches of foreign intellectual property rights.156
IX. CONCLUSION
The updating of the jurisdiction provision for tort claims in Order 11 is a
move in the right direction. The extension of jurisdiction to cases where
the damage is suffered in Singapore is a progressive step. It prevents over-
reliance on the ground of a tort committed within the jurisdiction that
invariably led to the application of the lex fori as the substantive law. It
does not, however, do away with considerations of the place of the tort
completely, as the concept is still relevant insofar as choice of law is relevant
in the argument on forum conveniens, and on the merits. In spite of this,
it is anticipated that there will be greater recourse to this new ground of
jurisdiction. However, the clause could have been better worded. As it
stands, in certain cases, it may allow the plaintiff to claim only for damage
suffered in Singapore but not for damage suffered outside arising from the
same tortious conduct.
The retention of the ground of jurisdiction based on the tort committed
within Singapore is also defensible, in spite of the difficulties inherent in
the concept of the place of the tort, in the light of the likelihood that
Singapore would in such a case be the natural forum, and the principle that
in such a case the law of Singapore applies exclusively to the claim. The
tie-in with the choice of law concept of the place of the tort also renders
it economical to decide the place of the tort once for both purposes.
However, this head of jurisdiction will need reconsideration should the
choice of law rules for tort be reformed in such a way as to remove the
concept of the place of the tort.157 If this development should take place,
then it would be better to have a ground of jurisdiction that is not dependent
on the localisation of the tort as such. In such a case, a test based on
significant events occurring within the jurisdiction would be more
appropriate.
Tyburn Productions Ltd v Conan Doyle, supra, note 152.
Deff Lapp Music v Stuart-Brown [1986] RFC 273.
For a criticism of the lacuna in conflict of laws for intellectual property, see Carter (1990)
61 BYBIL 395, 400.
See, eg, the statutory reform proposed by the English Law Commission, Private
International Law: Choice of Law in Tort and Delict (Law Com No 193).
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What remains is a jurisdictional lacuna in respect of significant acts occurring
within Singapore, where neither the damage nor the tort occurred in
Singapore. In such a case, arguably the forum also has an interest in
exercising jurisdiction because of its concern with the regulation of
conduct.158 The gap is not a serious one as, in the first place, the place of
acting often coincides with either the place of damage or the place of
wrong as such, and in the second place, the plaintiff can still try to invoke
some other ground of Order 11. However, it is still desirable to close the
gap. Indeed, one might go so far as to suggest that Rule l(f) be replaced
entirely by a provision based on any significant events constituting the tort
that occur in Singapore.159 This will be able to handle both the acts and
damage aspects of the tort. The place of the tort will still be relevant at the
jurisdiction stage, but only in the choice of law sense. This reform does no
harm to jurisdictional policies, and may indeed be beneficial in the
development of choice of law rules, if only to prevent clouding by
jurisdiction policies.
Postscript
In American Express Bank Ltd v Mohamed Toufic Al-Ozeir [1995] 1 MLJ
160, the Supreme Court of Malaysia varied the High Court decision in
[1994] 2 MLJ 687. The Court affirmed that the tort was committed in
Malaysia because the misrepresentation was received and acted upon there.
However, it did not apply the presumption that Malaysia was thereby the
natural forum, but by considering factors like the location of witnesses and
evidence, it found Singapore to be the natural forum, and so refused leave
to serve out of jurisdiction. One significant factor was the jurisdiction clause
in the contract in favour of Singapore. It thereby implicitly accepted that
tort claims were within the ambit of the clause.
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See, eg, the English and Irish position, supra, Part IV, Section B.
This is not unlike the Irish position, supra, Part IV, Section B, but to attempt the reform
under the verbal forumula of a “tort committed within the jurisdiction” can be productive
of confusion.
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